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Abstract 
With the already huge and growing amount of greenhouse gas emissions and a great deal 
of low-cost abatement options available, China is widely expected as the world’s number 
one host country of clean development mechanism (CDM) projects. But, making this 
potential a reality represents a significant challenge for China, because there has been a 
general lack of awareness by both the Chinese government and business communities, 
clear institutional structure, and implementation strategy. This has raised great concern 
about China’s ability to compete internationally for CDM projects and exploit fully its 
CDM potential. 
 
This paper aims to address how CDM projects will be effectively implemented in China 
by examining the major CDM capacity building projects in China with bilateral and 
multilateral donors, the treatment of low-cost, non-priority CDM projects, and how a 
system for application, approval and implementation of CDM projects is set up in China 
and what roles the main institutional actors are going to play in the system. We conclude 
that these capacity building assistances, the establishment of streamlined and transparent 
CDM procedures and sound governance, and the lessons learned and experience gained 
from the implementation of the CDM project in Inner Mongolia and the two Prototype 
Carbon Fund (PCF)’ projects will help China to take advantage of CDM opportunities. 
Moreover, in order to further capitalize on its CDM potential, there is a pressing need for 
the Chinese government to amend its current interim CDM regulations, in particular 
those controversial provisions on the eligibility to participate in CDM projects in China 
and the distribution of the revenues derived from CDM project between the project 
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developer and the Chinese government. We believe that taking these capacity building 
projects and the recommended actions to clearly define the sustainable development 
objective of the CDM and disseminate CDM knowledge to local authorities and project 
developers as sectorally and geographically wide as possible, addressing those 
controversial CDM provisions with clearer guidance, and gaining experience from real 
practice will reduce the perceived project risks and lower the barriers to CDM project 
development in China. This is, in turn, likely to lead a much greater percentage of carbon 
credits to come from CDM projects in China over the next several years. 
 
 
Keywords: Clean development mechanism; Capacity building; Charge/tax scheme; China; 
Price of CERs; Sustainable development 
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1. Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol incorporates three flexibility mechanisms. Since then, attention has 
been focused on the establishment of rules and modalities governing the operation of 
these mechanisms. One of the biggest accomplishments in the recent three Conference of 
the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
is that the rules and modalities have been agreed on to make the CDM fully operational. 
The CDM will channel private-sector investment into emissions abatement projects in 
developing countries. In this way, it will promote sustainable development in these 
countries while offering industrialized governments credits against their Kyoto targets.  
 
Many economic modelling studies indicate that, because of a great deal of low-cost 
abatement opportunities available in the energy sector of China and its sheer size of 
population, China is expected to emerge as the world’s number one host country of CDM 
projects. For instance, the studies of Zhang (1999, 2000, 2001, 2004a) show that about 
60% of the total CDM flows in 2010 go to China. The similar findings are also founded 
in the World Bank-led study on the CDM market potential, the results of which suggest 
that China will capture about 50% of the world’s CDM market in 2010 (World Bank, 
2004). But a general lack of awareness by both the Chinese government and business 
communities may cause China to not fully exploit its potential for CDM projects. The 
question is then how CDM projects will be effectively implemented there. 
 
This paper aims to address this challenging issue by examining the major CDM capacity 
building projects in China with bilateral and multilateral donors, the ways to deal with 
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low-cost, non-priority CDM projects, and how a system for application, approval and 
implementation of CDM projects is set up in China. Given that the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) 
are the two leading Chinese ministries in charge of formulating and coordinating China’s 
climate policy and actions, including CDM-related policies, regulations and criteria, the 
paper also addresses what roles the main institutional actors are going to play in the 
system. Our discussion will show that the development of sufficient capacity to initiate 
and undertake CDM projects and the clear institutional setting and implementation 
strategy has significant influence on effective implementation of CDM projects in China. 
This point is of high value to the Chinese government, because it underlines the 
importance for China to put a clear CDM policy, institutional setting and implementation 
strategy in place to encourage investors to develop CDM projects and thus fully exploit 
the potential of hosting CDM projects. The results of the study are also of particular 
interest to CDM investors, because they regard an effective implementation of CDM 
projects in China as a cost-effective means of obtaining certified emissions reductions 
(CERs) to meet their domestic emissions obligations in addition to the expansion of their 
business opportunities in the host country China. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses major international 
initiatives on CDM capacity building projects in China and their focuses, while Section 3 
explains why the Dutch government withdrew a CDM capacity building study project 
with China. Section 4 outlines two plausible ways to deal with low-cost, non-priority 
CDM projects in China. Section 5 describes how a system for application, approval and 
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implementation of CDM projects is set up in China and what roles the main institutional 
actors are going to play in the system. Section 6 discusses further steps needed to be 
taken in China to fully capitalize on its CDM potential. The paper ends with the main 
conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
 
2. Major international initiatives on CDM capacity building projects in China and 
their focuses 
Asian countries including China and India have not rushed into the CDM process, as they 
are concerned about the quality of the CDM and the integrity of the Kyoto Protocol.2 
This might be the desirable strategy when they have overly optimistic expectation for 
CDM investment. With the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, China gradually 
comes to realize that the size of the CDM market is much smaller than originally 
projected and that the CDM market is a competitive market. The issue then becomes 
getting something instead of nothing. Faced with weaker demand, Latin America is 
making the biggest strides in the CDM: having taken the lead in the CDM market, as 
shown in Figure 1, the region has gained experience in actual projects and has raised 
awareness among local business (Zhang, 2004b). This clearly indicates whether host 
countries are able to create favourable conditions for CDM investors does make a 
difference. All this, combined with China’s growing belief that CDM would play an 
important role in future global efforts to mitigate climate change, has led China to 
                                                 
2 Cited in the Report of the Asia Meeting on Efficient Clean Development Mechanism 
Operations, organised by the UNDP and the World Bank, 1-3 April 2003, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia. 
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gradually recognize the importance of capacity building at national, local and enterprise 
levels to ensure that China is well positioned to take advantage of CDM opport
the meantime, a growing number of international and bilateral donors are keen to suppo
CDM capacity building in China because they expect great potential of the CDM in 
China and feel the significant need for China to gain more insight into the CDM a
increase its capacity to init
unities. In 
rt 
nd 
iate and undertake CDM projects. 
 
 
Figure 1  The location of project-based emissions reductions generated in 2002 – Q3 
2003 (in million tons of CO2-equivalent) 
Source: Lecocq and Capoor (2003). 
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Table 1 briefly describes the major CDM capacity building projects in China. To harness 
potential synergies and minimize overlaps of these projects, the NDRC and the MOST 
have exerted strong co-ordination to ensure that each of these projects has different focus. 
For example, the World Bank project focuses on the methodological aspects of the CDM, 
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the ADB project on small-scale CDM energy projects, the C5 project on an operational 
model and case studies in the areas of urban transportation and renewable energy, and the 
UNDP project on capacity building needs of industry and three CDM pilot projects in the 
areas of renewable energy, energy efficiency and coal bed methane. Clearly, the Chinese 
government’s strong co-ordination on international and bilateral donors’ assistance 
indicates that China is attempting to make the best use of these capacity building projects 
to build domestic institution and capacity to initiate and undertake CDM projects. 
Implemented effectively, these capacity building projects could help China to get part of 
homework done. In the end, this will pave the way for the successful development and 
financing of CDM projects in China. 
 
 
Table 1  Major CDM capacity building projects in China 
Project title/ 
Donors 
Project purposes/main 
activities 
Donors’ 
contributions 
Status/Duration 
China CDM Study 
- funded by the 
World Bank, the 
Swiss Government 
and the German 
Agency for 
Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) 
1) Address a series of 
methodological and 
technical issues for the 
application of the CDM in 
China 
2) Undertake six CDM 
project case studies from 
the power sector and 
renewable energy field 
3) Analyze China’s CDM 
potential 
US$ 970,000 Draft final report 
completed 
November 2003 
 
Final report June 
2004 
Canada-China 
Cooperation in 
Climate Change 
(C5) – Canada 
project funded by 
the Canadian 
International 
1) Develop a CDM 
operational model 
2) Undertake case studies 
in the areas of urban 
transportation – CNG buses 
in Beijing, and renewable 
energy – biomass 
C$ 5 million June 2002 – June 
2004 
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Project title/ 
Donors 
Project purposes/main 
activities 
Donors’ 
contributions 
Status/Duration 
Development 
Agency (CIDA)3
gasification in Guangdong 
Province 
3) Carry out research study 
on carbon sinks 
Opportunities for 
the Clean 
Development 
Mechanism in the 
Energy Sector - 
ADB project 
financed by 
Canadian Co-
operation Fund for 
Climate Change 
 
1) Examine the 
opportunities of the CDM 
in the energy sector 
2) Develop handbooks of 
small-scale CDM energy 
projects 
3) Provide the PDDs of 
four small-scale CDM 
projects in Gansu and 
Guangxi provinces 
4) Assess necessary 
institutional framework at 
national and provincial 
levels to promote CDM 
operation 
US$ 775,000 September 2002 
– August 2003 
Building Capacity 
for the Clean 
Development 
Mechanism in 
China - UNDP 
project  funded by 
UN Foundation, 
Italian Ministry for  
Environment and 
Territory and 
Norwegian Agency 
for Development 
Cooperation  
(NORAD) 
 
1) Strengthen government’s 
institutions ability to 
implement procedures that 
will enable Chinese 
industry to gain smooth 
approval for suitable CDM 
projects 
2) Provide stakeholders 
with the skills and 
knowledge to enable CDM 
projects to be developed in 
China  
3) Prepare CDM pre-
feasibility studies and 
implement three CDM pilot 
projects in the areas of 
renewable energy, energy 
efficiency and coal bed 
methane 
4) Establish an improved 
US$ 1,458,000 
 
November 2003 -
November 2006 
                                                 
3 In addition to the CDM, the Canadian project also includes components such as 
Awareness and Outreach; National Communications; and Impacts and Adaptation. For 
further information, see the C5 project’s web site at: 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/etad/default.asp?lang=En&n=2E25F028-11. 
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Project title/ 
Donors 
Project purposes/main 
activities 
Donors’ 
contributions 
Status/Duration 
CDM database and develop 
website for information 
dissemination 
Sources: ADB (2002); The Government of the PRC and UNDP (2003); Tsinghua 
University (2003); The Web Site of Ottawa-based Resource Futures International at: 
http://www.rfigroup.com. 
 
 
3. Why did the Dutch government withdraw a CDM capacity building study project 
with China? 
It should be pointed out that not all international capacity building initiatives have been 
implemented in China as planned. The Netherlands had originally signed a project with 
the then State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) (the current National 
Development and Reform Commission) in April 2001 (Li, 2001), but the project was 
initially shelved and eventually withdrawn. Domestic bureaucratic hurdles between the 
then Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC) and the then 
SDPC played a part for this.4 The MOFTEC is the government counterpart of the UNDP 
and other multilateral and bilateral development aid agencies in China. The CICETE 
(China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchange), which is affiliated 
with the MOFTEC, is the coordinating authority of the Chinese government for all the 
UNDP and other multilateral and bilateral development aid projects in China. Logically, 
the partnership agreement of this kind was supposed to be signed between the MOFTEC 
and the Netherlands, not between the SDPC and the Netherlands. The MOFTEC as the 
government counterpart may well perceive to be sidelined right from the outset. 
                                                 
4 Author’ interviews in Beijing, January 2004.  
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Regardless of this allegation, many observers (Lin et al., 2004) believe that the major 
reason for this was due to differences in opinion of the project focus. The Dutch side 
placed the main emphasis on capacity building of the enterprises and the industry 
associations (in the chemical, iron and steel sectors) in order to facilitate the identification 
of good energy projects and enable the enterprises to participate in international tenders. 
Therefore, the Dutch side wanted direct involvement of the Chinese experts in the 
industry associations. The Chinese government, however, preferred the Dutch project to 
work together with a Chinese university within the field of research. 
 
This Dutch case provides valuable lessons for future capacity building projects in China. 
In my view, the two sides should clearly define the focus of the capacity building project 
in the first place and specify whether the focus would be allowed to adjust as 
circumstances change. As early as April 2001, the governments of the two countries had 
signed the co-operation agreement, but the implementation of the agreement had been 
well delayed because of domestic bureaucratic hurdles and differences in opinion of the 
project focus. In the meantime, the Chinese government had signed with other three 
donors on CDM capacity building projects. Although these agreements were signed much 
later than the one with the Dutch government, their implementations go much smoothly. 
This led the Dutch side to see that the three donors already worked with that university on 
research capacity building, and to question the additional value of doing similar project 
with it.5 Clearly, if the focus of the Dutch project were well defined and the flexibility to 
allow the adjustment of the project’s focus with mutual agreement of the two sides were 
                                                 
5 Author’ interview in Beijing on 15 January 2004.  
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built into the signed agreement, the unfortunate fate of the Dutch project could be 
avoided. 
 
Following this withdrawal, the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment (VROM) established the CERUPT (Certified Emission Reduction Unit 
Procurement Tender)6 program to directly purchase carbon credits through tender 
procedures. The initial CERUPT tenders led project developers to submit 78 expressions 
of interest. The Dutch government has put a national system in place to have selected the 
18 most promising projects in terms of cost-effectiveness and feasibility. Together, these 
projects are expected to deliver the total emissions reduction of over 16.5 million tons of 
CO2 equivalent (JIQ, 2003). Although only one project’s baseline methodology for 
landfill gas recovery has to date got approved of the 18 selected projects (JIQ, 2005) and 
the remaining selected projects for new methodologies are awaiting the acceptance by the 
CDM Executive Board (EB),7 it seems that the Dutch government is very satisfied with 
the results from these tenders. To have had a good price (about $5 per ton of CO2 
equivalent) for the tons purchased is more than expected.8 In the end, a combination of 
the different priorities on both sides and the promising results from the CERUPT tenders 
                                                 
6 For a description of the CERUPT program, see the web site at: www.carboncredits.nl. 
7 The CDM Executive Board has to date approved the 22 baseline methodologies (JIQ, 
2005). However, it should be pointed out that not every project developer needs to 
propose a new methodology to the EB for consideration and approval. A project 
developer is free to opt for using a methodology previously approved by the EB, if 
appropriate. 
8 Comments by Tilly Zwartepoorte, Director, Department of Climate Change and 
Industry of the VROM at the International Conference on Climate Policy after Marrakech: 
Towards Global Participation, Honolulu, Hawaii, 4-6 September 2003 (Zhang, 2004b). 
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resulted in the Dutch withdrawal of the project, and it is unlikely that the Dutch 
government will get involved in similar projects again in China.9 
 
It should be pointed out that although the Chinese government did not has its way, a 
Chinese company - the Inner Mongolia Long Yuan Wind Power Development 
Corporation -, with assistance of the Chinese Renewable Energy Industries Association, 
was awarded a CDM project contract on 13 March 2003 by the Dutch government 
through the CERUPT program (CDM Executive Board, 2004).10 Among the 18 selected 
projects (JIQ, 2003), this Inner Mongolia Huitengxile Wind Farm Project is the first 
CDM project in China. According to the SenterNovem, the tendering authority for the 
CERUPT, this project has been registered as a CDM project by the UNFCCC. The 
project is the second CERUPT CDM project after the registration of the Biomass Project 
in Rajasthan, India.11 The project involves the installation of 22 turbines, 12 of which 
have a capacity of 900 KW and 10 of which have a capacity of 1500 KW. All together 
provides a total power capacity of 25.8 MW. The crediting period of the Huitengxile 
Wind Farm Project is taken as 10 years up to 2014. According to the contract, the price of 
CERs to be paid is € 5.4 per ton of CO2 equivalent. As shown in Table 2,12 this price is 
closest to the maximum offering price of CERs for renewable energy projects under the 
CERUPT program. The total emission reductions over the ten-year crediting period are 
                                                 
9 Author’ interview in Beijing on 15 January 2004.  
10 “Chinese wind farm makes Kyoto profits from Dutch”, Reuters, 14 March 2003, 
Available at: http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=20156. 
11 “Wind Energy Project in China Registered”, 27 June 2005, Available at: 
http://www.senternovem.nl/Carboncredits/news/CER0133.asp. 
12 As shown in Table 2, the offering prices of CERs under the Dutch CERUPT program 
are differentiated according to technology types. Renewable energy projects in general 
have been assigned with a premium price. 
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estimated to be 514, 296 tons of CO2 equivalent (CDM Executive Board, 2004). Through 
undertaking the CDM project along with the two PCF projects,13 the local project 
developer has gained valuable experience through actual practice. In the meantime, these 
projects on their own will play the strategically important demonstration role in both 
increasing the outside investor’s confidence on local project developers and triggering 
more CDM projects in China. 
Table 2  The maximum offering prices of CERs under the Dutch CERUPT program 
CDM project type Maximum offering prices of CERs under 
the Dutch CERUPT program (€ per ton of 
CO2 equivalent) 
Renewable energy (excluding biomass) 
Biomass energy (excluding waste) 
Energy efficiency improvement 
Fossil fuel switch and methane recovery 
5.5 
4.4 
4.4 
3.3 
 
Source: Senter Internationaal (2001). 
 
                                                 
13 At this moment, two PCF projects in China are under development: one on coal bed 
methane capture and power generation in Shanxi Province, and another on run-of-river 
hydropower to displace coal-fired power in Gansu Province. The coal bed methane 
project is the first World Bank-supported CDM project in China. As one of the investors, 
the PCF contributes US$ 17 million in return of 4 million tons of CO2-equivalent of the 
total project’s emissions reduction of 49 million tons of CO2-equivalent. This is the first 
project in China that the PCF has signed the Emission Reductions Purchase Agreement 
with the local project developer. For the Xiaogushan hydropower project, the PCF invests 
US$ 9.22 million and receives the emissions reduction of 2.17 million tons of CO2-
equivalent of the total project’s emissions reduction of 2.93 million tons of CO2-
equivalent during the crediting period of 10 years (The information cited above on the 
PCF funding contributions and the received amounts of emissions reductions for these 
two PCF projects is taken from the PCF web site at: http://carbonfinance.org (accessed on 
27 July 2005)). Based on the PCF funding contributions and the received amounts of 
emissions reduction of CO2-equivalent, the purchasing prices of emissions reductions for 
these two PCF projects are set through negotiation at US$ 4.25 per ton of CO2-equivalent. 
This is the highest purchasing price that the PCF paid for the CERs until the end of the 
year 2004. See Zhang (2006) for further discussions on why China had initially hesitated 
to sign up as a host country of PCF projects, what has led China to endorse the PCF 
projects in the end, and the implications of the PCF’s offering prices for the emerging 
global carbon market. 
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 4. The treatment of low-cost, non-priority projects like HFC23 decomposition type 
of CDM projects in China 
Project selection criteria are very important because what kinds of criteria are going to be 
set and what kinds of projects are given priority certainly impact the scope of CDM 
projects and the overall size of investment. Led by the NDRC, a set of interim provisions 
and regulations on the operation of CDM in China, including project selection criteria, 
had been prepared. The approval of these provisions and regulations, along with the 
establishment of the National CDM Board and the CDM Project Management Center to 
be discussed in the next section, was expected to happen by the end of 2002, but had been 
delayed until June 2004 due to the restructuring of governmental organization.14 On 1 
July 2004, the Chinese National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC) 
held its annual meeting, and publicly released the long-awaited “Interim Measures for 
Operation and Management of CDM Projects in China”. As would be expected, given 
that China is more concerned about local pollutants, logically, CDM projects that would 
also lead to reductions in local pollutants, for example, energy efficiency improvement 
projects and renewable energy projects, would be given priority in China. On the other 
hand, outside investors/donors would probably like to have a broad choice of the types of 
CDM projects. Thus, project selection criteria could represent one area where the 
interests of the Chinese government conflict with those of outside investors. Closely 
related to this is the issue of how the Chinese government is going to deal with those low-
                                                 
14 Author’ interview in Beijing on 14 January 2004.  
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cost, non-priority projects like HFC2315 decomposition type of CDM projects, which 
only have climate benefits but do not offer other social and environmental benefits to host 
countries. In my view, there are two options that China could take: 
 
A) Remove such low-cost, non-priority projects like HFC23 decomposition type of 
CDM projects from the list of CDM projects and forbid the implementation of 
them in China. This option is too blunt. 
B) Charge fees or impose taxes to endorse any project under the CDM. This will 
ensure that the cheaper options are not the only ones that get implemented in 
China. Charges/taxes could be differentiated, with no charge/tax on those CDM 
projects that are in line with China’s national priorities and development needs. 
 
Legally speaking, either of the above options is allowed under the Kyoto Protocol. The 
CDM is both a market mechanism and a development mechanism, and has the twin goals 
of combating the global climate change and promoting sustainable development. A 
market mechanism means that the CDM market would gravitate towards the lowest 
mitigation options as measured by carbon value alone. On the other hand, although 
international agreements like the Kyoto Protocol and Marrakech Accords specify what 
are allowed (e.g., sinks projects and unilateral projects), it is up to individual developing 
country governments to define the project eligibility criteria and facilitate implementation 
                                                 
15 HFC23 is a by-product of the production of HFC22, which is used as a refrigerant and 
a raw material for the production of fluorinated resins. HFC23 is a very potent 
greenhouse gas. Its 100-year global warming potential is 11, 700 times that of CO2, 
implying that releasing one ton of HFC23 in the atmosphere is equivalent to 11, 700 tons 
of CO2 emissions. 
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of priority projects that are in line with their national priorities and development need.16 
In other words, individual governments still have flexibility in choices that fit best into 
their national circumstances. Although different choice would certainly impact the scope 
of CDM projects and the overall size of investment, either of the above options would 
enable the Chinese government to filter CDM projects, thus encouraging those CDM 
projects that promote both climate and sustainable development goals. 
  
There are both advantages and disadvantages of promoting particularly favorable CDM 
projects through a charge/tax scheme. On the positive side, a charge/tax on certain types 
of CDM projects would direct CDM capital flows towards those projects with the high 
overlap possible with other social and environmental criteria. This will ensure that the 
CDM helps accelerate the Chinese economy to move along the more sustainable paths. 
On the negative side, China’s ability to use the CDM to promote more costly, sustainable 
development projects over cheaper alternatives that offer less co-benefits will be 
determined by the price competition that develops on the international carbon market. 
This would limit the degree to which 1) the charge/tax is imposed on low-cost, non-
priority CDM projects and 2) more costly projects could be advanced as candidate 
investments. 
                                                 
16 For example, at this time, China does not allow unilateral CDM projects without direct 
involvement from partners of industrialized countries. This is partly because unilateral 
CDM projects do not contain the element of technology transfer and have no additional 
up-front investments from industrialized country partners. Another consideration might 
be that unilateral CDM projects, if allowed, would lead to an increase of cheaper permits 
flooding the already weak demand market, which would do more harm to developing 
countries. Ultimately, you could accumulate huge amount of credits. Later, when 
negotiating future commitments, other countries could argue that you should take on and 
meet more stringent commitments because of the many accumulated credits. 
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 While the Kyoto Protocol provisions allow the differentiated treatment of CERs from 
different types of CDM projects, does it conflict with any WTO rule? This boils down to 
whether CERs are considered as products or services under the WTO. Because CERs will 
be traded internationally and will have an economic value, they can in economic terms be 
characterized as commodities. However, the domestic or international tradability of CERs 
does not change them into products or services for WTO purposes, because the terms 
“product” and “service” are legal terms that take on specific meanings in the context of 
the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and the GATS (General Agreement 
on Trade in Services) (Werksman, 1999). Even if CERs themselves are neither products 
nor services under the WTO, then rules differentiating the sources of CERs are not 
covered by WTO disciplines. Thus, an individual country is free to treat the sources of 
CERs differently as long as such differential treatment is not based on ownership.  
 
Currently, a charge/tax scheme is under discussion in China. In case China is determined 
to adopt a charge/tax scheme for the purpose of promoting particularly favorable CDM 
projects, the following design and implementation issues have to be considered 
prudently: 
• On what basis and how much to charge under a charge/tax scheme? 
• On what basis and how to differentiate revenue sharing for the Chinese 
government or charge under a charge/tax scheme? 
• If charges are imposed, who will collect charges? If not by tax authorities, how to 
be coordinated with tax authorities in collecting and using charges? 
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• How to treat developed regions and less-developed regions within China, and how 
to treat the area with more urgent need to protect the environment within the same 
region under a charge/tax scheme? 
 
These issues are only partially on the agenda of the Chinese government departments 
concerned (Lu, 2004), but are very important because they are essential to the success of 
such a scheme. It is unlikely that such a scheme will commence until these issues are 
seriously addressed. 
 
 
5. The main institutional actors in the policymaking and implementation of CDM 
projects in China17 
As early as February 1990, the NCCCC was established in China. This inter-ministerial 
coordinating body is the highest policymaking organ for climate policymaking in China. 
The body is to supervise and coordinate ministries and agencies in their efforts to address 
climate change. The NCCCC is responsible for deliberation and coordination of national 
climate strategy, including CDM-related policies, regulations and criteria. Because the 
NDRC is in charge of the national development plan and national project evaluation and 
because climate change may potentially have serious social and economic implications, 
the Climate Change Office - the executive office of the NCCCC, is situated in the 
NRDC’s Department of Regional Economy and is responsible for routine work of the 
Committee. It is undisputed that the NDRC has played and will continue to play the 
                                                 
17 The expected functions of major institutions engaged in CDM-related policymaking and 
management in China are based on Gao and Li (2003) and Sun (2003). 
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leading role in formulating and coordinating China’s overall climate policy and actions.18 
The NDRC is the designated national authority (DNA) in China, and makes the final 
approval of the CDM projects in China. Because science and technology play a very 
important role in addressing climate change problem and the project mechanisms involve 
many technical issues, the MOST has involved in climate issues from the right beginning, 
and will continue to provide expertise on the technical aspects of the CDM. The MOST 
has a representative on the CDM Executive Board. For matters related to the UNFCCC 
and its subsidiary instruments (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol, the Marrakech Accords), the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will continue to take the lead in the international 
climate negotiations. 
 
5.1 Institutional structure of the CDM management in China 
Transparent CDM procedures and sound governance will reduce the transaction costs of 
implementing CDM projects and mobilize investment from the private sector. The 
Chinese government has set as priorities the establishment of the institutional structure 
and streamlined procedures to reduce transaction costs of the CDM operation in China. 
For this, the National CDM Board has been set up under the NCCCC. This Board 
consists of seven ministries (the NDRC, the MOST, the MFA, the State Environmental 
Protection Agency, China Meteorological Administration, the Ministry of Finance, and 
the Ministry of Agriculture), and is co-chaired by the NDRC and the MOST. The main 
responsibilities of the Board include developing regulations and procedures for the 
                                                 
18 This explains why the Chinese delegations to the Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC are headed by the minister-level official from the NDRC. This makes the 
Chinese case different from the US case where the head is Under Secretary of US State 
Department. 
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operation of CDM projects in China, providing guidance to the operation of the CDM 
Project Management Center (PMC), approving the CDM projects (in particular, 
examining an estimate of the CERs generated by the project and the price of CERs) that 
have passed the pre-screening by the PMC, reporting to the NCCCC the overall progress 
in implementation and performance of the CDM project activities, and making 
recommendations to the NCCCC on both how to solve the problems encountered in 
implementing CDM projects and amendments to the interim regulations and procedures 
for the operation of CDM projects in China. 
 
The CDM Project Management Center has yet to be established. The Center is to be 
subordinated by the National CDM Board. Situated in the NDRC, the Center is mandated 
to take responsibility for all practical aspects of managing the CDM process in China. It 
will mainly operate on the project level and will be not involved in policymaking. 
Specifically, the PMC will engage in the following main project-related functions: 
 
• Accept the application of CDM projects. 
• Screen the candidate CDM projects. 
• Submit those CDM projects that have passed the initial review to the National 
CDM Board. 
• Develop and maintain an information system for China’s CDM projects, and 
make related information available for the public access. 
• Monitor, and provide support and advice in the implementation process. 
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• Assist the Board in identifying capacity building needs and undertake and/or 
facilitate CDM-specific capacity building activities. 
• Take on other responsibilities assigned by the Board. 
• Provide information and make recommendations to the Board on CDM-related 
issues. 
 
The establishment and the authorized size of the PMC have yet to be approved by the 
Committee of the Central Organization Constructing. This approval has been delayed due 
to the restructuring of governmental organization. Prior to the operation of the PMC, the 
Climate Change Office takes the temporary responsibility. 
 
5.2 Application and approval procedures for CDM projects in China 
A CDM project consists of the general component and the CDM component. The general 
component is the part related to specific project construction. This part has to go through 
the existing application and approval procedures for conventional project construction. 
Before being approved, a newly built project is required to undergo an environmental 
impact assessment (EIA). This EIA ensures that the pollution control facilities are designed, 
built and put into operation simultaneously with the principal part of the new project (the 
so-called “three-synchronous”). At the moment, there are no additional requirements for 
the EIA of the CDM projects. But for the CDM component, the following application and 
approval procedures apply: 
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• A domestic project developer prepares a project design document (PDD) of the 
CDM project and sends the PDD to the PMC for an approval. 
• The PMC screens all the CDM projects, and submits those CDM projects that 
have passed the screening process to the Board. 
• The Board will examine the CDM projects that have passed the screening process 
by the PMC, and submit those approved projects to the NDRC.  
• In collaboration with the MOST and the MFA, the NDRC makes the final 
approval of the CDM projects, issues the approval letter on behalf of the 
government of China, and asks the PMC to put the approved projects on record. 
• The project developer selects an appropriate designated operational entity (DOE) 
to undertake an independent evaluation of the PDD against the requirements of 
the CDM. If the proposed project is determined valid, the DOE submits a request 
for registration to the CDM Executive Board. 
• The project developer reports to the PMC the status of the approval within 10 
days after it being communicated from the CDM Executive Board. 
 
 
6. Further steps needed to be taken  
In order to fully capitalize on its CDM potential, further steps need to be taken in China. 
They include but are not limited to the following four ones. First, given that private 
investors have complained that China’s requirements for approving CDM in the light of 
sustainable development (SD) are very unclear, China should make it clear to outside 
investors what is meant by the SD objective of the CDM on China’s national conditions. 
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The Kyoto Protocol only provides the general principle, but it is up to each individual 
developing country government to define what is meant by whether a specific CDM 
project meets the sustainable development objective of that host country. Currently, 
conflicting views have been expressed from the different government departments in 
China.19 Some department indicates that China intends to develop a set of specific SD 
indicators in the future, which are to be used to evaluate whether an individual CDM 
project implemented in China meets the SD objective. By contrast, other department 
concerned says that there is no need to separately develop a set of specific SD indicators, 
because a CDM project, which has undergone the EIA and has met the “three-
synchronous” requirements, is considered to has met the SD objective. Doing so will only 
add additional burden on CDM developers. In order to facilitate the implementation of 
CDM projects, China should make its stance on this more clear to CDM developers in the 
future, whatever that is. In case China is determined to develop the criteria against which 
the SD objective of CDM projects is measured, a set of specific SD indicators must be well 
defined and practically workable. For those low-priority CDM projects on the SD ground, 
we suggest adopting an economic instrument to deal with them, rather than removing them 
from the list of CDM projects and forbidding the implementation of them in China. 
 
Another important step is to further disseminate CDM knowledge to local authorities and 
project developers, and get them involved in the process of CDM rules and procedures-
setting. Currently, the CDM capacity is concentrated centrally in China, with the central 
government departments concerned and a few Beijing-based research institutes gained 
                                                 
19 Author’ interviews in Beijing, January 2004.  
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vital expertise and improved knowledge on the CDM. Although the current capacity 
building projects with international and bilateral donors, the CDM project in Inner 
Mongolia and the two PCF projects have gradually began to get local authorities and 
project developers familiarized with CDM-related knowledge, programs and financing 
opportunities, the scope of their involvement and their representations of sectors and 
regions are far from the point needed to fully exploit its CDM potential.  
 
Third, the Chinese government, with assistances of international and bilateral donors, 
should support two domestic legal entities to apply for accreditation/designation as a 
DOE. The DOE under the CDM validates and subsequently requests registration of a 
proposed CDM project activity, verifies emission reduction of a registered CDM project 
activity, certifies as appropriate and requests the CDM EB to issue CERs accordingly. 
Thus, the DOE plays a very important role in a CDM project cycle. To date, the CDM EB 
has approved ten DOEs and is in the process of considering 30 applications.20 However, 
none of these applicants are from China. This means that CDM projects in China have to 
rely on the expensive services of foreign DOEs for validation, registration, verification 
and certification. This inevitably increases transaction costs of CDM projects. Thus, to 
foster the effective implementation of CDM projects in China, China has to get initially 
at least two domestic legal entities accredited as the DOEs, although more domestic 
DOEs could be established later on as the demand for DOE services increases. 
 
                                                 
20 Information on DOEs and an exhaustive list of DOEs are available at the UNFCCC 
web site at: http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE (accessed on 26 July 2005). 
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Fourth and most importantly, in order to be more attractive to outside investors and help 
promote the development and implementation of CDM projects in China, the Chinese 
government needs to amend timely its interim measures for operation and management of 
CDM projects in such a manner to make them even more efficient and transparent and 
easy to operate in practice. This referred interim measures are deemed a positive 
development because they provide the provisional CDM guideline to facilitate the 
smooth implementation of CDM projects without making a lengthy administrative and 
legislative procedure a precondition for project approval and clarify few concerns by 
project developers. That said, the interim measures still leave many design and 
implementation issues unsettled. Although the concern has been raised about Article 15.4 
under the interim measures, which empowers the Chinese government to review and 
approve price and the commercial terms of the transactions of CERs, the most 
controversial issues relate to Article 11 and Article 24 under the interim measures. These 
two provisions have raised particular concerns among foreign participants and potential 
investors. Article 11 requires that solely Chinese or Chinese-controlled enterprises are 
eligible for project development. Clearly, this Article expresses an unwillingness to allow 
most of the CDM benefits to flow out of China and imposes significant barrier to foreign 
investments in CDM projects in China. In my view, the Article needs to be amended at 
least to allow some exceptions to reflect, for example, the technology content of CDM 
projects. Such exceptions could be made on a case-by-case basis. For example, given that 
China has emphasised the component of technology transfer under the CDM, in case a 
specific CDM project in the priority area as identified in Article 4 under the interim 
measures has the much high content of technology (e.g., the type of advanced technology 
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that China needs most), the foreign company undertaking this project could be allowed to 
own more than 50% of equity in the project. Another provision of particular concern is 
Article 24. This Article regulates the distribution of the revenues derived from CDM 
project between the project developer and the Chinese government (with the revenues to 
be owned solely by the project developer prior to the determination of the Chinese 
government). To date, the Chinese government has not yet specified how to distribute the 
revenues of CERs. It is also unclear how the Chinese government would use the 
distribution of the revenues as a means of encouraging those prioritized types of CDM 
projects as identified in Article 4 under the interim measures, although it would be 
expected that the government’s share in the revenues from these types of the CDM 
projects would be very low or even zero. This has triggered great concern about the 
danger of losing part, or all, of the revenues of CERs from those non-prioritized types of 
CDM projects through the governmental revenue-sharing clause. To date, the Chinese 
government has taken notes of these issues and concerns, and has recognised that there is 
a need to, at least to some extent, amend the current interim measures because these 
controversial issues have increased the perceived project risks and have created the 
barriers to CDM project development in China. However, it is expected that this 
amending process will be not that easy because it needs to well balance the Chinese 
government’s concerns about protecting the Chinese interests with outside investors’ 
desirability of increasing their control over project development and reducing uncertainty 
over return on investment. 
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7. Conclusions and recommendations 
With the already huge and growing amount of greenhouse gas emissions and a great deal 
of low-cost abatement options available, China is widely expected as the world’s number 
one host country of CDM projects. But, making this potential a reality represents a 
significant challenge for China. This has raised great concern about China’s ability to 
compete internationally for CDM projects and exploit fully its CDM potential. 
 
Generally speaking, Asian countries have not rushed into the CDM process, as they are 
concerned about the quality of the CDM and the integrity of the Kyoto Protocol. In this 
regard, China is no exception. This might be the desirable strategy when they have overly 
optimistic expectation for CDM investment. With the US withdrawal from the Kyoto 
Protocol, China gradually comes to realize that the size of the CDM market is much 
smaller than originally projected and that the CDM market is a competitive market. This 
realistic expectation and the sense of urgency to gain real experience through learning-
by-doing, combined with positive development in international negotiations on the rules 
and modalities for governing the operation of the CDM, have led to a positive and 
determined attitude of China towards the CDM. At least the following two positive and 
encouraging development trends reflect that China is taking a proactive and sustainable 
policy towards the CDM. 
 
First, realizing the significant need to gain more insight into the CDM and increase its 
capacity to initiate and undertake CDM projects, China is working with a growing 
number of international and bilateral donors on many CDM capacity building projects. 
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To harness potential synergies and minimize overlaps of these projects, the Chinese 
government has exerted strong co-ordination to ensure that each of these projects has 
different focus and that all these projects together help to build capacity needed at 
national, local and enterprise levels to ensure that China is well positioned to take 
advantage of CDM opportunities. In addition, China has endorsed the two PCF projects, 
and a Chinese company has been awarded a CDM project contract - the first CDM 
project in China - through the Dutch CERUPT program, although the Chinese 
government did not has its way in hoping to translate the signed agreement with the 
Netherlands into a research capacity building project on the CDM. No doubt, undertaking 
these projects will provide China with much-needed, real learning and practice about 
baseline setting, project boundaries, monitoring and verification at project levels, these 
aspects that are most relevant to all prospective projects under the CDM but in which 
China has gained little experience in the AIJ (Activities Implemented Jointly) pilot 
phase.21 All these capacity building projects, the CDM project in Inner Mongolia and the 
two PCF projects will help to disseminate CDM-related knowledge, programs and 
financing opportunities to various stakeholders in China, particularly in the energy sector, 
and will lay the groundwork for the successful development and financing of CDM 
projects there.  
 
Second, China has prioritized the areas of the CDM investment, and is putting clear 
institutional structure and implementation strategy in place. This institutional building 
involves establishing the National CDM Board and the CDM Project Management Center 
                                                 
21 See Zhang (2004a) for the reasons why China is a slow starter of AIJ projects and its 
implications.  
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and defining their responsibility and functions in the development of regulations and 
procedures and a system for application, approval and implementation of CDM projects. 
In so doing, the Chinese government has clearly attempted to have streamlined and 
transparent CDM procedures and sound governance of clearer lines of responsibility and 
functions. These efforts will ease domestic procedures for future CDM projects, and help 
to reduce transaction costs of CDM projects and make CDM projects in China more 
attractive to outside investors. It is fair to say that the CDM project in Inner Mongolia 
with the Netherlands and the two PCF projects with the World Bank, to some extent, 
have helped to speed up the institutional building process in China, although its official 
approval had been delayed somewhat due to the restructuring of the overall governmental 
organization in China. Moreover, as the PCF experience suggests, these projects on their 
own have played the strategically important demonstration role in both increasing the 
outside investor’s confidence on local project developers and triggering more CDM 
projects in China. 
 
On the other hand, it is fair to say that China has lagged behind Latin America regarding 
the awareness of the CDM, the formulation of CDM policy, institutional set-up, private 
sector involvement in the CDM, and the volume of emissions reductions exchanged. But 
China is catching up quickly as it undertakes with massive capacity building with 
international and bilateral donors and puts the necessary institutional structure and 
implementation strategy in place. Clearly, these capacity building assistances, the 
establishment of streamlined and transparent CDM procedures and sound governance, 
and the lessons learned and experience gained from the implementation of the CDM 
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project in Inner Mongolia and the two PCF projects will greatly enhance China’s ability 
to internationally compete for CDM projects and effectively implement CDM projects. 
Moreover, in order to further capitalize on its CDM potential as suggested by many 
economic modeling studies, there is a pressing need for the Chinese government to 
amend its current interim CDM regulations, in particular those controversial provisions 
on the eligibility to participate in CDM projects in China and the distribution of the 
revenues derived from CDM project between the project developer and the Chinese 
government. Furthermore, we recommend that China should make its SD objective of the 
CDM well defined, disseminate CDM knowledge to local authorities and project 
developers as sectorally and geographically wide as possible, and get at least two 
domestic legal entities accredited as the DOEs. We believe that taking these capacity 
building projects and the recommended actions, addressing those controversial CDM 
provisions with clearer guidance, and gaining experience from real practice will reduce 
the perceived project risks and lower the barriers to CDM project development in China. 
  
Clearly, these aforementioned domestic efforts will boost China’s ability to develop 
CDM projects. However, whether China is able to fully capitalize on its CDM potential 
depends on the price of CERs. Since March 2005, the European Union allowances 
(EUAs) have been traded at the price of over €20 per ton of CO2-equivalent, as compared 
with €7-9 in 2004. Allowance-based transactions, which represented only 2.5% of the 
total volume of assets exchanged on the carbon market from its inception to May 2004, 
now account for nearly as much volume exchanged as project-based transactions (Lecocq 
and Capoor, 2005). By contrast, CERs are changing hands for €4-9 per ton of CO2-
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equivalent. Given that the EU “Linking Directive” allows the import of CDM credits into 
the EU allowance market, this huge price gap between CERs and EUAs suggests that 
there is a huge demand for CDM credits. However, the price of purchasing project-based 
emission reductions is considered too low, although it is not expected to be higher than 
the price of EUAs, because purchasing project-based emission reductions involves a 
range of risks, such as project risk (namely, whether or not the project will adequately 
perform and deliver the expected amount of emission reductions), country risk and 
Kyoto-related risk (namely, the project might ultimately not be registered under the 
Kyoto Protocol). This substantial difference in the prices of CERs and EUAs raises the 
question of whether non-Annex 1 countries including China are able to supply enough 
CDM credits before 2012. No doubt, the additional cash flow from CDM credits can 
boost the internal rate of return. But, the World Bank-led study found that this added 
value from the current low price of CERs is insufficient to cover the incremental costs of 
implementing many CDM projects in China. Put another way, the corresponding stream 
of CERs will be rarely the decisive factor that makes the most significant difference and 
renders these projects viable. This, combined with the lead times required for CDM 
projects and the current highly debatable process to review and approve CDM projects by 
the CDM Executive Board, raises both the concerns about China’s ability to fully 
capitalize on its CDM potential and the uncertainty over whether there will be sufficient 
amount of CDM credits available for meeting the demand from the EU and other Kyoto-
constrained parties before 2012. At the current low prices, a clear and understandable 
preference is to highly potent source of emissions, such as HFC23.22 This will simply 
                                                 
22 The World Bank study shows that HFC23 decomposition project dominates among all 
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exclude a whole range of other CDM projects. All this clearly suggests that having the 
appropriate price level of CERs is critical for the development of CDM market, because, 
in the long run, the price of CERs, either too high or too low, would severely hamper the 
development of the market.23 To that end, effective CDM policies, in particular those in 
major players on the carbon market, are needed to strike the balance between 
encouraging investors to engage CDM projects (thus increasing the volume of CERs of 
CDM projects) and ensuring the quality of CERs. 
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project types, providing about 25% of the worldwide emission reductions supplied from 
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DC, it was decided to set up the CERs Price Committee. This clearly reflects that host 
countries have great concerns about the price of CERs.  
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